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THE ABM TREATY, NEW TECHNOLOGY AND
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
Frances V. Harbour*
On October 6, 1985, Robert C. McFarlane, then National Security Advisor,
announced on NBC's Meet the Press that the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty' permitted the development and testing of strategic defense systems based
on "new physical concepts." '2 This "new interpretation" of the Treaty, he
asserted, would give the United States new latitude in the early stages of President
Ronald Reagan's ballistic missile defense project, the Strategic Defense Initiative
3
(SDI).
McFarlane's statement set off a furor both inside and outside the Reagan
Administration. It is not clear from the public record whether McFarlane had
cleared the statement first with the President. It is certain that Secretary of State
4
George Schultz, among others, was caught by surprise.
Dismayed reactions from the Congress and from North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) allies, together with questions from within the Administration, forced a retrenchment in position. Schultz announced the results on
October 14. The new interpretation was "fully justified," said the Secretary of
State, but this was a "moot point" because the Reagan Administration intended
to continue its SDI program "in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of
the [ABM] Treaty's obligations." 5
Correct or incorrect, the point is anything but moot. The "new interpretation" of the ABM Treaty has taken on a role of its own in the debate surrounding
SDI. From the beginning, the Reagan Administration's position marked one side
of a domestic and international debate. Reams of material have been produced
supporting and criticizing the new interpretation. Nor has the tone of debate
moderated over time. For example, in May 1988 the Defense Science Board's
Strategic Defense Milestone Panel wrote bluntly, "There is not a force acting on
the SDI program that is more damaging or more insidious than the present
*
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John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Fellow in International Peace and Security
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Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503
[hereinafter ABM Treaty]. See the Appendix to this article for the relevant articles and
paragraphs of the ABM Treaty referred to in the text.
Interview of MacFarlane on Meet the Press (Oct. 6, 1985); reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BULL.
33 (Dec. 1985).

See, e.g., U.S.

DEF. DEP'T DEF. Sci. BOARD, REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE MILESTONE

PANEL 6, 7 (1988) [hereinafter STRATEGIc
4.
5.

DEFENSE MILESTONE PtAL].

GARTHoFF, POLICY VERsus Tm LAW: THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY 3 (1987).

Address by Secretary of State Schultz to the North Atlantic Assembly, entitled Arms Control,
Strategic Stability and Global Security (Oct. 14, 1985); reprinted in 85 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 23
(Dec. 1985).

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 15:119

debate on the 'narrow versus broad' interpretation of the ABM Treaty." '6 Supporters of the strict interpretation, for their part, strongly agree that the effect
has been "insidious," but they agree with equal heat that the outcome of the
debate is important.
WHO CARES ANYHOW?
In spite of all the verbiage, the important differences between the two sides
come down to one set of obligations in a complex treaty. The central question
in the debate is whether the ABM Treaty permits the development and testing
of space-based ballistic missile defense (BDM) systems or components that are
not traditional ABM launchers, interceptor missiles or radars. Certainly this is
not as important a question as whether development, testing or deployment of
BMD is a good idea from a strategic, political or economic standpoint. But it is
nevertheless a question worth answering in its own right for several reasons.
First of all, as suggested above, a "broad" versus "narrow" interpretation
has clear implications for the future of the SDI program. The debate has already
led Congress to refuse to fund tests not within the strict interpretation of the
ABM Treaty. Through compromise, the Reagan Administration was able to keep
the limitations on testing only implicitly linked to the Treaty. However as SDI
advances further beyond the unverifiable laboratory research stage-which both
sides agree is allowed-there will be greater and greater temptation for the United
States to go beyond a limiting definition.
Space-based BMD testing, or any other mobile testing of models against
ballistic missiles, would be forbidden by the old understanding of what is allowed.
It would be permitted by the new, if the technology involved did not use ABM
launchers, ABM interceptor missiles or traditional ABM radars. This sort of
testing could give a more direct, more accurate and perhaps less expensive reading
of the capabilities of the new technology applied for something like its intended
purpose. On the other hand, unleashing immature BMD technology while damaging the ABM Treaty could prove an expensive, destabilizing mistake, especially
if the technical hopes of SDI advocates turn out to be overly optimistic.
On the whole, Congress prefers a stricter definition of the obligations of the
ABM Treaty than did the Reagan Administration. Congressional committment
to the strict interpretation is unlikely to change during the administration of
President George Bush. Major changes seem unlikely since one of the more
important bases of the new interpretation is that the treaty to which the Senate
thought it gave its advice and consent was not the treaty actually negotiated with
the Soviets; only the treaty negotiated with the Soviets is binding. This contention
strikes to the heart of the Senate's treaty powers. Any administration which
makes a reinterpretation claim will probably find that congressional-executive
relations, always prone to problems, can become even more strained. In particular,
congressional suspicion that the executive branch feels free to tell the Congress
one thing and negotiating partners something else will make the domestic aspect
of negotiating international treaties-especially arms control treaties-that much
harder.

6.
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A presidential claim of reinterpretation would have an impact on future
arms control treaty hearings. One would expect the Congress to impose more
stringent requirements for the provision of the negotiating record; one would
also expect longer delays in the ratification process and more formal interpretations by the Senate of its understanding of the specific provisions of a treaty.
Indeed, there is evidence that this process has already begun. In May 1988
the Senate imposed a formal condition to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty that a future president may not reinterpret the treaty in contradiction
to the statements of administration witnesses. 7
The spotlight on the negotiation and ratification process in the ABM case
puts new emphasis on the formal negotiation record outside the text itself. The
raising of stakes has made the domestic negotiations over position even more
highly politicized, and over smaller issues. Because what is in the negotiating
record has become more consequential politically, agreement among the various
constituencies within the executive branch about what may be said during international negotiations may also become more difficult than in the past.
When internal domestic political processes surrounding treaty negotiation
become more difficult and chancy, it cannot help negatively affecting the prospects
for either arms control or international law. If the Senate stiffens its requirements
for ratification, other nations will feel confirmed in their already existing suspicions that negotiations with the executive branch are not to be considered binding
on the Congress.
Conversely, a unilateral reinterpretation by the executive does not help U.S.
credibility. It also whittles away at other countries' willingness to engage in
negotiations with the United States. The Soviet Union and smaller nations will
grow reluctant to enter into agreements with the United States, and they may
even grow cynical in their own interpretations of treaty obligations. One of the
main reasons countries allow themselves to be bound under treaty and by other
international laws is to encourage the cooperation of others. If the fabric of
mutual constraint is unjustifiably weakened in the case of one treaty, all of
international law is weakened.
Thus, if the U.S. government is to accept the broad interpretation instead
of the narrow one, it is important that it make certain that its credentials are
legally impeccable. However, the language of the Treaty itself, the subsequent
practice of the two parties and the negotiating record each suggests that the legal
foundation for the broad interpretation is very shaky.
THE ISSUES IN THE DEBATE
Those who believe in the strict interpretation and those who have adopted
the broad interpretation actually share opinions on more aspects of the ABM
Treaty than those on which they disagree. The two sides agree that the Treaty
permits 1972-type ABM systems to be deployed at one site (formerly two). Both
agree that there can be no testing, development or deployment of mobile ABM
systems that use ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles or ABM radars, or
any of those components individually, without amending or abrogating the Treaty.

7.
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(The provision thus includes space-based interceptor missiles such as those envisioned by many proposed SDI system architectures.)
Both sides accept that the Treaty forbids deployment of ABM systems or
components utilizing other physical principles than were available in 1972, although the two differ on the exact source of the ban. They agree that the testing
and development of fixed land-based systems is permitted within agreed test
ranges and that "research" into new forms of technology is allowed. 8
On the other hand, in order to arrive at such different conclusions regarding
exotic space-based technology, the two sides treat key portions of the Treaty
quite differently from one another. The most important portions of the Treaty
for the debate are articles II and V and Agreed Statement D. The two sides also
differ, to a lesser degree, on articles I, III and IV.
Article II defines ABM systems. Article V, paragraph 1, forbids testing,
development, and deployment of mobile ABM systems. Agreed Statement D
requires the parties to negotiate specific limits before deploying any ABM systems
or components "based on other physical principles."
Broad interpretationists hold that Agreed Statement D's guidance on the
deployment of "exotic" systems and components is the only limitation the Treaty
places on such systems. 9 For their part, the proponents of the strict interpretation
argue that Agreed Statement D reinforces the obligation-set up by the network
of strictures in articles I, II, III and V-not to deploy exotic space-based or
other mobile systems or components. They argue in addition that testing and
development of future space-, air-, or mobile land-based ABM technology is
forbidden by articles II and V, paragraph 1. However, testing and development
of fixed land-based technologies is implicitly allowed by articles IV and V and
by Agreed Statement D. 10
Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, formerly the State Department's legal advisor,
and arms control advisor Paul H. Nitze present the most detailed and knowledgeable analyses of the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty allowing testing
and development of space-based exotic technologies. In the analysis that follows,
Sofaer's and Nitze's ideas and arguments will provide the main source for
statements about the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
On the side of the strict interpretationists, John Rhinelander and Raymond
L. Garthoff are among the key representatives. They have not only examined
the text and historical record in detail but, like Nitze, were principal negotiators
on the ABM Treaty. To this list must be added United States Senator Sam Nunn
(D-Ga.), whose analysis of the Treaty text, ratification process and subsequent
practice is virtually without precedent in congressional history. Their arguments
provide the basis for an understanding of the strict interpretation.
WHO IS CORRECT?
Under international law, the place to begin analysis is with the plain sense
of the Treaty.
8.
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Textual Analysis: Article II
For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting
of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles. . .; (b) ABM launchers...; and (c) ABM
radars. ....
1
Article II is in many ways the most important of the core articles of the
ABM Treaty. If an ABM system is defined in terms of components in article II,
rather than in terms of its function, then no matter what the intention of the
parties shown by other Treaty articles, future components and systems that do
not include the 1972 elements would not necessarily be implied by the phrase
"antiballistic missile systems and components." In particular, it would be difficult
to argue that the article V, paragraph 1 ban on testing space-based and other
mobile ABM systems includes those based on "other physical principles." Agreed
Statement D's ban on deployment of exotic systems and their components would
be left as the Treaty's sole limitation on future technology-as the broad
interpretationists argue. It is therefore important to settle this question first.
Sofaer argues that a functional definition is not the most plausible understanding of article II, paragraph 1. He contends that "an ABM system is one
that serves the functions described and that consists of the type of components
that existed 'currently."" '1 2 As evidence, he suggests that the ABM Treaty itself
"consistently use[s] the terms 'ABM system' and 'components' in contexts that
indicate the parties were in fact referring to systems and components based on
then-utilized physical principles."' 3
Based on the text, Sofaer is clearly wrong in his main conclusion about
article II. The list of current components in article II, paragraph 1, as quoted
above, may only be read to mean that ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles
and ABM radars were the elements that made up an ABM system in 1972. In
English grammar, a comma followed by a participial phrase (i.e., "currently
consisting of") indicates a nonrestrictive clause. A nonrestrictive clause simply
adds information to the main body of the sentence. For example, the sentence,
"Tom ate the pies, throwing away their crusts," gives information about Tom's
behavior. "Tom ate the pies throwing away their crusts," on the other hand,
indicates that he ate only the lively pies. The former adds information about the
subject, Tom. The latter restricts the class of pies, the direct object. In the same
way, the list of elements in article II, paragraph 1 adds information about the
current shape of the system. It does not restrict the class of ABM systems to
missiles, launchers and/or radars. This may be a very fine point, however. As
Rhinelander points out in an article written with James P. Rubin, the addition
of the adverb "currently" flags the fact that there could be "ABM systems"
made up of different kinds of components. "Otherwise," he notes, "the word
'currently' would not be necessary.' ' 14
Sofaer's, Nitze's and other broad interpretationists' contention that "ABM
systems" and "components" might not mean those which are based on future

11.
12.
13.
14.

ABM Treaty, art. II, para. 1.
Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 H~Av. L. REv. 1974 (1986).
Id.
Rhinelander & Rubin, supra note 10, at 5.
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(post-1972) technologies is completely overturned by the language of Agreed
Statement D. It reads in part: "[T]he Parties agree that in the event ABM
systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of
substituting for ABM interceptor missile, ABM launchers or ABM radars are
created in the future. . . ."' This phrasing explicitly indicates that an "ABM
system" or "component" may indeed be based on forms of technology not
available in 1972.
Moreover, unlike article II, the language of Agreed Statement D does indicate
that its obligations are limited to certain kinds of systems, those exotic ABM
systems with components that may be substituted for ABM missiles, launchers
and radars. The "and including" phrasing is precisely the formulation that article
II would have been required to utilize, had Sofaer's analysis of its meaning been
correct.
On the other hand, Sofaer is correct that there are some places in the Treaty
where the language should be read to mean then-current systems. These are the
articles whose language explicitly deals with launchers, interceptor missiles and
radars. Examples he does not cite are the specific and limited permissions to
deploy given by article III. Of course, the general unspecified prohibition on
other deployments also found in article III must include forms of technology
other than those available in 1972, by the article II definition.
Textual Analysis: Article V, Paragraph 1 and Agreed Statement D
Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components
which are sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based. 16 In order to insure
fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components
except as provided in [airticle III of the Treaty, the parties agree that in the
event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components
capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM
radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such components would
be subject to discussion in accordance with [alrticle XIV of the Treaty. 7
The second key difference between the narrow and broad interpretatons lies
in the meaning of article V, paragraph 1, and in the implications of Agreed
Statement D. The proponents of the narrow interpretation contend that article
V, paragraph 1 limits development and testing as well as deployment of spacebased exotic systems, even though it does not say so explicitly. Those who support
the loose interpretation argue that only Agreed Statement D limits exotic ABMs;
and thus testing of such systems is allowed.
The evidence on this point supports the strict interpretation. That is, article
V, paragraph 1 includes future systems based on 1972 ABM technology; and
therefore Agreed Statement D is not the sole limitation placed by the ABM
Treaty on exotic systems. The textual case on article V, paragraph 1 is a simple
one. As the previous paragraph demonstrated, the term "ABM system" in article
II is functional and includes ABM systems with components beyond the 1972
list. Thus, whenever the term "ABM system" appears in the Treaty text, if
15.
16.
17.

ABM Treaty, Agreed Statement D.
ABM Treaty, art. V, para. 1.
ABM Treaty, Agreed Statement D.
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otherwise unmodified, it includes exotic systems based on forms of technology
not yet available in 1972. By definition then, when article V, paragraph 1 forbids
development, testing and deployment of mobile ABM systems-including those
based in space-a reader must understand this to mean, in the words of article
II, any "system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory."' 8 This means that the narrow interpretationists are correct about the
limits on testing in article V, paragraph 1.
The same line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that Agreed Statement
D is not the Treaty's only limit on the deployment of future systems. Article V,
paragraph 1 prohibits the deployment of any mobile "ABM systems" whether
based on land, at sea or in space.' 9 Another layer is added by article I which
forbids the parties "to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country" and pledges them "not to provide a base for such a system." ' 20 As
Rhinelander has pointed out, "Space-based and other mobile ABM systems, by
their very nature, cannot be confined to a single site, and are therefore nationwide
' 21
defenses by definition.
The ban on mobile ABM systems in article V, paragraph 1 would not, by
itself, have limited deployment of fixed land-based systems of any description.
However, Agreed Statement D requires that deployment of any ABM system or
component "based on other physical principles," be based on negotiation of
"specific limitations" and so picks up deployment of land-based systems. 22 Article
III, taken with article II as a definitional base, means that, under the Treaty as
currently written, deployment of all ABM systems that do not correspond to
article III's launch, missile and radar patterns may not be deployed. Deployment
of ABM systems "based on other physical principles" is thus forbidden by a
network of articles I, II, III and V, and Agreed Statement D.
It is true, as Sofaer points out, that this network provides a redundant set
of limits on deployment. 23 However, Garthoff has a good rejoinder to this point
when he argues that "there are other redundancies in the treaty and even in
Sofaer's reconstituted treaty. And there is no rule that you have to have no

redundancies.

"24

Subsequent Practice
If the language of a treaty is not fully clear, an important potential source
of clarification under international law is the subsequent behavior of the parties.
Consistent behavior is thought to give evidence of the original intentions of the
signatories and even in some cases to lend independent legal weight to their
obligations. Unilateral changes in behavior related to a treaty do not generally
affect its status.
The definition of what constitutes an ABM system, as supported by the
actual behavior of the United States and Soviet Union after signing the ABM
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

ABM Treaty, art. II, para. 1.
ABM Treaty, art. V, para. 1.
ABM Treaty, art. I, para. 2.
Rhinelander & Rubin, supra note 10, at 5.
ABM Treaty, Agreed Statement D.
Sofaer, supra note 12, at 1976.
GARTHo1F, supra note 4, at 24.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 15:119

Treaty, is more difficult to deduce then might appear at first glance. In a rather
peculiar and limited sense, subsequent practice supports the argument that the
definition of an ABM system is limited to ABM launchers, ABM interceptor
missiles and ABM radars. The only "ABM" systems developed, tested or deployed
by either the Unted States or Soviet Union have had these very characteristics.
More importantly for both the definitional issue and the question of limits
on development and testing, however, is that the obverse is true. No one contends
that either side has undertaken full-scale testing or deployment of a space-based
exotic ABM system or its components. No testing or deployment is the outcome
one would expect if the strict interpretation of articles II and V is the correct
one. Nevertheless, as Sofaer and others have pointed out, the weight of this fact
is weakened by the sheer technical difficulties which would have been encountered
had either the United States or the Soviet Union desired to act differently.
Lack of opportunity for actual practice lends special importance to statements
indicating the U.S and Soviet positions on the issue. In this case, public officials
and official publications of both nations have routinely used the term "ABM
system" in a functional way to mean any system "to counter strategic missiles
or their elements in flight trajectory." Official statements have generally remained
consistent with the apparent belief that testing of space-based exotic systems is
forbidden by the Treaty.
Ratification Hearings
The first statements about future technology were made during the ABM
Treaty ratification hearings. It is true, as Sofaer argues, that during the ratification
hearings many statements on future technology focused on deployment, and not
on testing or development. 2 However, these so-called "inconsistencies" cannot
be read to support either the broad or narrow interpretation. They are simply
not relevant to the central controversies in the reinterpretation debate, since no
one on either side argues that deployment is ultimately permissible. As Nunn
points out, what Sofaer has not done is to identify any statements requiring a
26
repudiation of the strict interpretation of the Treaty.
There are, however, a number of passages supporting the narrow interpretation. For example, at the beginning of a paragraph in his official report entitled
Future ABM Systems, then Secretary of State William Rogers wrote, "[Article
II, paragraph 1] defines an ABM system in terms of its function as a 'system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,"' He
noted that these systems "currently" (in 1972) were made up of ABM missiles,
ABM launchers and ABM radars.27 More explicitly on the question of testing
and development of exotic systems and components, Acting Army Chief of Staff
General Bruce Palmer told the Senate Armed Forces Committee, which was
holding hearings on the military implications of the Treaty, that it "does not

25.
26.
27.

Sofaer, supra note 12, at 1983.
Nunn, Interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Part P. The Senate Ratification Proceedings, 133
CONG. REc. S2973 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1987).
Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements Transmitted to the Congress, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1
(1972).
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prohibit... development in the fixed land-based system. We can look at futuristic
'
systems as long as they are fixed and land-based." 28
These and other quotations support the conclusion that the executive branch
understood the term "ABM system" in a functional sense and apparently believed
at the time of its ratification that the Treaty banned development, testing and
deployment of space-based ABM systems, as well as components based on
unfamiliar forms of technology.
The reports of the Soviet ratification process that have reached the United
States are not adequate to judge between the narrow and broad interpretations.
Although research was mentioned, there is no evidence 29that the development and
testing of exotic technology was specifically discussed.
Later Statements
Statements by both U.S. and Soviet officials before MacFarlane's October
1985 television interview also seem to support a strict interpretation of the ABM
Treaty.
For the United States, as Nunn pointed out in a March 1987 speech, Sofaer
and the broad interpretationists have "not identified any official statements prior
to October 1985 in which the U.S. government expressly took the position that
the Treaty permitted testing and development of mobile [or] space-based exotic
[systems]."30 Documents including the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's
annual compilations of arms control agreements stated from 1972 on that
deployment of new ABM technology is not permitted without consultation. Again,
however, as with the ratification hearings, this is not a point contented by either
side in the ABM Treaty reinterpretation debate.
The president's annual Arms Control Impact Statements cast light on the
development issue. From 1979, when the first detailed impact statement was
issued, to the 1985 statement, the last one before the Reagan Administration's
announcement of the broad interpretation, all of the statements explicitly used
the term "ABM system" (or its equivalent "ballistic missile defense" (BMD)
system) in a way which indicates the term includes systems not based on 1972
technology and makes clear that exotic systems may not be developed or tested.
For example, the 1984 report argued, "The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or components for
such systems applies to directed energy technology (or any other technology) used
for this purpose. '31 The evidentiary weight of the Arms Control Impact Statements is enhanced when one recognizes that they were compiled through a
rigorous interagency process before submission to Congress.
There were also strong indications before the announcement of the Reagan
Administration position that the Soviet Union did not consider the limits on
28.
29.
30.
31.

Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Armed Forces, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 443 (1972) (statement of Gen. Palmer).
See GARTHOFF, supra note 4, at 76 (quoting Grechko, An Important Contribution to Strengthening Peace and Security, Pravda, Sept. 30, 1972) and Rhinelander, supra note 8, at 139.
Nunn, Interpretation of the ABM Treaty Part I1: The Subsequent Practice, 133 CONG. REC.
S3091 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1987).
FIscAl YEAR 1984 ARMs CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 382-15, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 266-267 (1983).
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testing and development on the Treaty to refer exclusively to 1972-era technology
or components. One example arose in March 1976 during the second round of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Soviet Ambassador Victor Karpov, who
had been involved in the negotiations surrounding article II of the ABM Treaty,
opposed using the word "currently" in one of the provisions of the new text. It
had been appropriate in article II of the ABM Treaty, said Karpov, because that
Treaty had been unlimited in time, and new kinds of systems had been expected
32
to emerge.
Even more to the point, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, in charge of
Soviet arms control matters for the Soviet General Staff, said in an April 1983
interview that the ABM Treaty, and article V, papragraph 1 in particular, "bans
both sides from developing [an ABM] defense based on new physical principleslasers, microwave radiation beam weapons and so forth. 33 General Secretary
Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev and other
Soviet officials also made statements consistent with the strict interpretation of
34
the Treaty in the period before the reinterpretation.
Soviet official opinion continues publicly to support the strict interpretation.
There is no reliable way, however, to determine whether there is merit in the
argument that the Soviet's sole motive is to keep the United States bound by the
strict interpretation. Therefore, Soviet statements made after October 1985 will
not be examined in this paper. The fact that the Soviets have since objected to
the reinterpretation does have some legal weight, though, since if they had not,
the new position could be considered legally acceptable to them.
It is clear that between 1972 and 1985, in both the United States and the
Soviet Union, the official treatment in action and word of the development and
testing of "new technology" ABM systems corresponded to the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. That this was not a central issue does not affect the
status or direction of the relevant practice.
It is also true that both sides made statements about the acceptability of
such research. Undoubtedly, research was undertaken by both sides. Moreover,
both sides said that, under the Treaty, deploying exotic systems was unacceptable
without prior negotiation. Such statements are simply not relevant to the reinterpretation debate, although they affect both nations' BMD programs, because
these issues are not in debate by either side. Thus, it is correct to say that the
broad Reagan Administration interpretation of the Treaty on the testing question
was a new phenomenon and that the strict interpretation was, and is, the
traditional one.

32.
33.
34.

Garthoff, U.S. and Soviet Subsequent Practice Under the ABM Treaty: History Confirms the
TraditionalMeaning, 17 ARms CONTROL TODAY 17 (Sept. 1987).
G~ARHon', supra note 4, at 82 (quoting from an interview with Chervov in Pravda (Bratislava
edition), Apr. 29, 1983).
See, e.g., Garthoff, supra note 32, at 18 (quoting an interview with Akhromeyev in Pravda,
June 4, 1985) and Gorbachev Interview, Tns (Sep. 9, 1985). There are also reports of a May
1985 statement by a member of the Soviet delegation to the Standing Consultative Commission,
see infra note 52 and accompanying text, asserting that new forms of ABM technology could
not be tested in space. See GARaTHo, supra note 4, at 82; Statement by Rhinelander before
the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Intemat'l Security and Sci. of the House Comm. on Foreign
Aff., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 26, 1987).
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ABM Negotiation History
It is in the ABM Treaty's negotiation history that the strongest evidence for
the broad interpretation can be found. On balance, however, even in this area
the strict interpretation of the Treaty seems the more likely one. There are two
critical points related to the Treaty's negotiation history that lend plausibility to
the traditional strict interpretation.
The first is the position of the American negotiators. In 1971 presidential
advisors instructed them to obtain a ban on testing and development, as well as
deployment, of futuristic mobile systems. The delegation received these instructions in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 127, which was dated
August 12, 1971 .5 The negotiators were told, however, to leave the door open
for testing and developing new kinds of fixed systems such as the land-based
lasers whose future seemed so bright at the time. Nevertheless, they were instructed
to seek to prevent the deployment of any kind of novel system without prior
amendment to the Treaty. This was not an easy charge, especially since they
36
were also to avoid advertising the loophole they were trying to create.
At the time, members of the U.S. delegation believed they had acheived
their goal. For example, in his role as legal counsel, Rhinelander wrote a series
of memoranda registering "open" and "settled" issues in the Treaty text and
recording the delegation's consensus on the meaning of various articles. His final
memo, dated May 20, 1972, read in part, "[Article V, paragraph 1] prohibits
the development, testing, or deployment of. . .[any] device capable of substituting
for an ABM launcher, ABM interceptor missile or ABM radar that is sea-based,
37
air-based, space-based or mobile land-based (such as an air-based 'killer' laser)."
With the exception of Nitze, who later became a Reagan Administration official,
the major negotiators continue to believe that the ABM Treaty does not allow
the development and testing of mobile systems "based on other physical principles." 3"
The second major point in favor of the strict interpretation stems directly
from the history of article V, paragraph 1 and Agreed Statement D. The delegation
originally proposed a single draft article in response to NSDM 127. The first
paragraph of the article was supposed to limit development, testing, and deployment of mobile systems, explicitly including "other devices to perform the
functions of" ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles, and ABM radars. 9 The
draft article's second paragraph was supposed to limit deployment of any exotic
ABM system, including fixed systems. Thus, the original intent of the delegates

35.
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37.
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Part : Language and Negotiating History, 133 CONG. Rac. S6626-27 (daily ed. May 19, 1987)
(containing NSDM 127, Aug. 12, 1971, as well as several other negotiation documents
declassified by the State Dep't Off. of the Legal Advisor) [hereinafter OLA Declassified
Negotiation History].
Id.
Memorandum from John Rhinelander to the U.S. Arms Control Delegation, entitled Article
by Article Analysis of the ABM Treaty (May 24, 1974).
See Smith, Keeny, Rhinelander & Garthoff, Sofaer's Last Stand?, 17 Ams CONTROL TODAY
14-16 (Oct. 1987) and address by Nitze to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies, entitled Interpreting the ABM Treaty (Apr. 1, 1987).
OLA Declassified Negotiation History, supra note 35, at S6627 (quoting declassified Negotiation
Document A-408).
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in regard to the text became article V, paragraph 1 was partly to limit new forms
of technology. The two clauses were split because the Soviets were prepared to
limit the mobile systems in September 1971, but were not willing to agree to
limit deployment of future fixed systems until February. 40
U.S. negotiators agreed to remove the specific references to exotic technology
in what ultimately became article V, paragraph I only because the Soviet
delegation assured them that the novel systems and components were still covered
by the new language. In early September 1971, the Soviets proposed that the
article read that the parties would not develop, test or deploy "mobile landbased, air-based or space-based ABM systems or their components." Karpov,
the chief Soviet negotiator on article V, told the Americans on September 15
that his proposal "obviate[d] the requirement for the phrase 'other devices for
performing the functions of these components." ' ' 41 In response to an American
question, he agreed "that the Soviet text meant 'any type of present or future
components' of ABM systems.''42
Karpov's statement is highly significant. Not only did it make possible the
American acceptance of the Soviet language, but it is the strongest possible
evidence that the Soviets accepted the American position on development and
testing of exotic space-based systems. As Nunn has pointed out, Karpov's reply
"was an authoritative statement made by the senior Soviet official handling this
matter at a formal negotiation session that had been called for the express
purpose of concluding a final deal on this issue." 43
On the other hand, the plausibility of the broad interpretation is enhanced
by the fact that, in the fall of 1971, the Soviet draft of article II specifically
defined ABM in terms of components, and not by function. Moreover, the
Soviets continued to object to limits on future systems later on in the fall of
1971, after the draft proposal that became article V, paragraph 1 was accepted.
Of these two points, the second presents a more serious objection. That the
Soviets in late 1971 still limited article II's definition of "ABM system" to stated
components is not a real problem for strict interpretationists since, as early as
September 2, Karpov acknowledged that the Treaty would ultimately include
limits wider than the components listed in article I1.He specifically mentioned
the proposed article on mobile systems." Furthermore, negotiators on both sides
frequently used the term "ABM system" and "future ABM systems" in ways
that indicated they meant to include exotic technology. 45
Questions raised by continued Soviet objections can be settled by remembering that there were many good reasons why the Soviets continued to object
to undefined technology-reasons that had nothing to do with mobile ABM
systems. In particular, in the fall of 1971, the Soviet delegation had not yet
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OLA Declassified Negotiation History, supra note 35, at S6629 (discussing Negotiation Document A-503).
Id.
Nunn, Interpretation of the ABM Treaty Part IV: An Examination of Judge Sofaer's Analysis
of the Negotiating Record, 133 CONG. REc. S6814 (daily ed. May 20, 1987).
OLA Declassified Negotiation History, supra note 35, at S6644-45 (Negotiation Document A-
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agreed to the other part of the American draft article, to wit, the banning of all
futuristic systems, including fixed land-based lasers. In the context of the time,
when opposing future systems the Soviets need not have specified fixed landbased systems. The correct understanding of the unmodified term would have
been clear to both sides since the disposition of mobile systems had already been
settled.46
On several occasions, the Soviet delegation explicitly endorsed the limitation
on new kinds of systems. For example, negotiator Vadim Chilutsky said in
December 1971, "The prohibition on air-based, space-based, land-based [and
'47
other] ABM systems is adequate to cover the problem of future systems."
Perhaps equally important, the Soviets expressed worry that the ABM Treaty
could be used to degrade their air defense system, especially their surface-to-air
missiles and radars. This is a thread running through the negotiations surrounding
article II as well as the two U.S. draft articles on future systems.
The importance of the air defense issue to the Soviets is illustrated by the
following example. In December 1971, the Soviets rapidly abandoned all objections to a functional definition of ABM systems in article II when the Americans
added the connecting phrase "currently consisting of" between the Americans'
functional definition and the Soviets' list of components.48 This new formulation
gave a functional definition of ABM systems, which for the first time distinguished
between exotic technologies and air defense, since air defense technology was
excluded from the list of current components of an ABM system. When they
objected to unspecified future systems, the Soviets were making sure that upgraded
air defense was not being forbidden by article II. They needed to know just what
the U.S. delegation had in mind when it wanted to limit future systems. 49 Neither
side addressed the subject specifically. Both sides were trying to acquire information about the shape of the other's research into exotic land-based technology,
such as lasers. At the same time, however, negotiators were averse to sharing
information about their own country's programs. The mutual fishing expedition
did nothing to help the clarity of the written record.
On balance, then, the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty seems to better
explain its negotiators' intentions, as evidenced by what survives and has been
declassified from the written record. The U.S. participants clearly intended to
limit development, testing, and deployment of space-based and other mobile
exotic systems, and to ban only deployment of fixed ABM systems. The Soviets
apparently agreed to this, although they accepted the ban on testing, development
and deployment of novel mobile systems more easily than the ban on deployment
of fixed systems based on new principles. There are genuine ambiguities in the
record, but there are good reasons to conclude that most apparent inconsistencies
come from trying to interpret a written record of a dynamic-and deliberately
confusing- negotiating process, and doing so apart from the context in which
it was written.
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GARTHoFF, supra note 4, at 53-54 and Nunn, supra note 43, at S6817.
OLA Declassified Negotiation History, supra note 35, at S6656 (Negotiation Document A-613).
GARTHoFF, supra note 4, at 44.
Rhinelander & Rubin, supra note 10, at 8.
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CONCLUSION
After looking closely at the ABM Treaty text, the subsequent practice of the
two parties and the unclassified portion of the negotiating record, the most
sensible conclusion is that both parties to the Treaty intended its prohibitions on
testing and development to cover space-based technology not based on familiar
principles and components. They wrote this language into the Treaty in 1972 and
have consistently so acted and spoken since. They also apparently intended to
allow development and testing of exotic, fixed, land-based systems, but while
preventing actual deployment without amendment to the Treaty. In 1972, this
latter point was probably more important to the parties than was controlling
potential space-based systems, as the introduction of fixed laser systems appeared
to be just over the horizon. The more general prohibition on the deployment of
exotic technologies may be redundant, but it is not inconsistent with a desire to
limit mobile ABM systems even more closely than fixed ones. In light of these
conclusions, it would seem that a more proper description for the narrow
interpretation would actually be the "rigorous interpretation," because its position
is so well supported by so many forms of evidence.
In actual practice, the Reagan Administration never violated its understanding
of the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Congress put it on notice that
no test during fiscal years 1987 or 1988 that violated the narrow interpretation
would receive funding, although the Administration was able to negotiate an
agreement to keep the congressional limitation from being explicitly linked to the
Treaty. In the summer of 1988, there was no indication that Congress would
allow any wider testing during fiscal 1989-that is, up until September 30, 1989.
Indeed, a legislative desire for even tighter reins on testing and a decided
preference for fixed, land-based technology, at least for the short run, seemed
to be the rule in both the authorization and appropriations committees of the
House and Senate.
For the Bush Administration, future history will depend on a number of
factors. While Vice President, Bush was a strong supporter of President Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative. Bush supported development and testing of new ABM
technology, including SDI. He held on several occasions that such testing and
development did not violate the ABM Treaty.50 But whether President Bush's
Administration can put its leader's views into practice will depend on the
disposition of the 101st Congress. There is also the issue of bureaucratic and
technical momentum. As even a limited strategic defense research program
develops a history and a constituency, more realistic tests and even deploymentinside or outside the traditional interpretation-are likely to become more politically attractive. Thus the debate over the implications of the ABM Treaty for
SDI is by no means dead yet.
It is important to keep the argument over the testing of space-based exotic
systems in context, however. Even if the strict interpretation of the traety is
applied to SDI, it would not keep the program confined to the laboratory. This
is partly because a number of key concepts in the ABM Treaty are not defined
in purely legal terms.
50.

See, e.g., Candidate's Forum: The Republicans, 18 Asms CONTROL TODAY 9 (March 1988).
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For instance, article II says that an "ABM system" currently consists of
ABM launchers, ABM interceptor missiles and ABM radars. Article V, paragraph
1 says that mobile ABM systems and components may not be developed, tested
or deployed. But nowhere in the Treaty are components defined. The negotiating
record is clear on the point that "adjuncts" to ABM launchers, ABM interceptor
missiles and ABM radars are permitted-but what is an "adjunct?" Agreed
Statement D says that "components capable of substituting for" missiles, launchers and radars may not be deployed. Does that mean all testing of mobile
components is subject to the threshold? Would a system that was "popped up"that is, one launched on warning of an attack but not permanently based in
space-be considered mobile? Is there a line, other than the ability to verify
activity by national technical means, that can distinguish clearly permitted research
from forbidden development and testing? Does a verification threshold mean
that, if the other side can detect something, it is forbidden? What if the test in
question does not involve an ABM "component?" Even the question of what
constitutes an ABM system or component "based on other physical principles"
remains open. Are kinetic energy weapons "based on other physical principles?"
They would destroy ballistic missiles in flight by breaking them up with guided
or unguided pellets. This proposal follows the same basic principle as a bullet
fired from a gun-or a slingshot-but is it covered by the Treaty?
The only specific guidance on testing comes from article IV's requirement
that tests be kept to agreed test ranges and from a 1978 Agreed Statement giving
some criteria for the term "tested in an ABM mode." Neither of these offers
much advice on testing technologies aside from ABM launchers, ABM interceptor
missiles or ABM radars, though.
So far, SDI has kept to what the Defense Department has concluded is the
narrow interpretation by keeping voltage and sensing capabilities down; by not
linking "sub-components" into networks where they would constitute a system
(component?) capable of substituting in its entirety for one of the familiar three;
and, most of all, by not aiming the new technology at any object in ballistic
orbit. As early as 1990, however, a test has been scheduled which would involve
the simulation of a Soviet missile in flight. Would tracking it constitute a test
of an "ABM component" in "an ABM mode?" Many arms control advocates
would say so, although the Pentagon has argued in the negative.
Moreover, tests of antisatellite weapons are currently forbidden by Congress,
but apparently not by the ABM Treaty. Much of the technology useful against
satellites may also prove to have BMD capabilities. Judgment may become even
more difficult in the future as scientists develop technology that does not
correspond precisely to the purpose of one of the traditional components, e.g.,
a directed energy weapon that has, in addition to its ability to destroy warheads,
a capacity to discriminate between reentry vehicles and decoys.
Even with a rigorous interpretation forbidding development and testing of
exotic space-based ABM technologies, there are many critical questions remaining
to be answered about just what is permitted and what is forbidden. These should
be dealt with in the Standing Consultative Commission created by the Treaty"'
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or by other bilateral bodies or even at summit meetings between the U.S. and
Soviet heads of state. They should not be further obfuscated by doubtful
interpretations of matters that traditionally had been relatively clear.
Both sides in the debate see the broad interpretation as a first step in the
breaking down of the ABM Treaty-or of the United States breaking out. Thus
a final reason for careful consideration before accepting a new interpretation of
the Treaty is the importance of the Treaty itself, both as a military entity and
as a symbol of successful arms control. Supporters of the ABM Treaty believe
it has been a successful limitation on an otherwise irresistible technology that,
first of all, could have led to an expensive arms race; second, would have been
destabilizing in a crisis; third, was politically unpopular in areas of potential
deployment; and fourth, would have been easy to overwhelm in any event in an
era of developing multiple warhead technology. 52 Treaty supporters also argue
that seriously weakening or destroying the Treaty could discredit the arms control
process in general by decapitating its most prominent member. If any of these
problems hold for future ballistic missile defense-and many independent scientists
and scholars believe they do-it would be a powerful argument against threatening
the stability provided by the ABM Treaty.
At this stage, considerably more must be learned about the potentialities of
BMD before any rational decision can be made about the deployment of any
system much beyond a limited fixed-site one. Notably, a study sponsored by the
American Physical Society in 1987 concluded that it will be a decade or longer
before scientists can make any informed judgments about how well directed
energy weapons will perform as BMD components.53 An Office of Technology
Assessment study issued during the spring of 1988 warned that adequate research
plans have apparently not been laid in order to counter a number of potential
Soviet anti-SDI countermeasures. 5 4 Compounding this is the danger of depending
on intricate computer software that cannot be fully field tested before the day it
is called upon to coordinate the national defense. The combination of problems,
the study concluded, would leave a "significant probability" of the system's
"catastrophic failure" in the event of war. These are grim assessments. But even
if these conclusions turn out to be overly pessimistic, Americans clearly have not
yet the knowledge to make a sensible decision on strategic grounds, let alone
economic or political ones, about deploying SDI.
A limited, fixed-site BMD system employing launchers and missiles within
defined ceilings, such as that advocated by Nunn and his Senate allies, would be
permissible under the ABM Treaty. A decision to go forward with such a system
must take into account many factors, strategic, political and economic. Much, if
not all, of what the United States needs to know about more advanced systems
can be discovered over the next decade or so, and within the parameters of the
narrow interpretation. In the meantime, it would be both unnecessary and
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imprudent to rupture the ABM Treaty in order to pursue a technology whose
value to the United States is at best open to question.
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APPENDIX: TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
SYSTEMS*
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devestating consequences for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems
would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and
would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear
weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile
systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of
strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable
conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation
of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures towards reductions in
strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the
strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and
to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the
territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to
deploy ABM systems for defense of individual region except as provided for in
Article III of this Treaty.
ARTICLE II
I. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting
of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for
launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
*

23 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (1972).
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(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode....
ARTICLE III
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components
except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may
deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one
hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within
no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular
and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred
and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] silo
launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers
and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two
large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM
radars operational or under construction on the date of the signature of the
Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and
(3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the
potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM
radars.
ARTICLE IV
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems
or their components used for development or testing, and located within current
or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total
of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.
ARTICLE V
Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or
components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. ...
ARTICLE XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this
Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission,
within the framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed
and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers
necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing
on the provisions of this Treaty ....
ARTICLE XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments
shall enter into force in 'accordance with the procedures governing the entry into
force of this Treaty.
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2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals
thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty ...
AGREED STATEMENT D
In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems
and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties
agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and
including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM
launchers or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such
components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and
agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty ....

